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Abstract. This study explores how institutional factors increase the possibility of Korea’s 
three main shipbuilders’ capital accumulation and what effect institutional factors have on 
their capital accumulation. By examining the structural features of these shipbuilders’ labor 
and changes in their wage-labor nexus, the mechanisms of dual-channel capital 
accumulation are better understood. Ultimately, our findings show that dual-channel capital 
accumulation, which allows three shipbuilders to secure the practicality of overall loss 
minimization or overall profit maximization, has been created through the evolution of their 
labor structure.  
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1. Introduction 
long with the automobile and IT industries, the shipbuilding and offshore 
industry is a major growth engine for the South Korean economy. This 
field focuses on the construction of various ships and floating vessels as 
well as the installation of giant offshore structures and facilities used for the 
purpose of drilling and extracting gas. It is a complex industry directly affected 
byupstream industries such asshipping, defense, fishing, and marine leisure; at the 
same time, it has a direct effect on downstream industries like steel, machinery, and 
electronics and electricity. 
The shipbuilding and offshore industry has two distinct particularities: it is both 
labor-intensive and capital-intensive. In general, floating vessels and offshore 
plants are massive structures completed through variegated and complicated 
construction processes based customization, reflecting very few customers’ discrete 
requirements. Thus, there is a strong possibility that automation of the critical 
technology skills required for their construction may be subject to significant 
limitations, and the shipbuilding and offshore industry can be regarded as a labor-
intensive industry that needs to secure enough high-skilled labor. Further, a large 
amount of capital investment is required to construct the infrastructure and 
equipment needed to build larger ships and giant offshore structures. Moreover, as 
the long construction process for customized ships or offshore structures generally 
takes several years to complete, it is necessary to obtain adequate financinguntil 
payment is received from a customer. Thus, the shipbuilding and offshore industry 
is a capital-intensive industry. 
Compared to first-movers in the shipbuilding industry such as the United 
Kingdom, Germany, and Sweden, South Korea has a relatively short history of 
 
aa† Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Yoshida-honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-
8501, Japan.  
. 0757533400 
. kim.woojin.8v@kyoto-u.ac.jp 
A 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 4(1), W. Kim, p.9-29. 
10 
shipbuilding and can be regarded as a latecomer to the industry. According to The 
Korea Offshore and Shipbuilding Association (2016), the modernized concept of 
the shipbuilding industry was introduced to Korea by Japanese shipbuilders who 
stared businesses in Korea by the end of the 19th century, but, in reality, Korea’s 
shipbuilding industry lacked the basic infrastructure and equipment to build larger 
ships, and the government of Korea was unable to provide enough capital for 
building this infrastructure and equipment before the 1960s. Further, Korea’s 
shipbuilding technology stayed at an overall low level in comparison with first-
movers. However, in 1967, the Korean government legislated the “Shipbuilding 
Industry Promotion Act” for the purposes of improving Korea’s shipbuilding 
technology and encouraging its shipbuilding industry, and enacted the “Promotion 
Act for the Machinery Industry” not only to promote Korea’s industry development 
but also to cultivate the machinery industry. Both Acts helped the Korean 
governmentto establish a legal basis upon which to foster continuous development 
of the shipbuilding industry. With this legal basis, the government of Korea has 
more aggressively pursued the heavy and chemical industry policy from the period 
of the “Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan” (1972–1976), which was a 
trigger of the establishment of conglomerate-oriented large shipyards;i as a result, 
the basis for Korea’s shipbuilding industry to reach a world-class level was created 
gradually. Figure 1 shows that since the 1980s, Korea’s shipbuilding industry has 
grown rapidly through its growth and maturation periods, and has firmly occupied 
a strong position as one of the leading shipbuilding nations since the 2000s. In 
particular, Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI), Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine 
Engineering (DSME), and Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI)—the so-called “Three 
Giants” that performed a pivotal role in Korea’s becoming a leading shipbuilding 
nation—recorded an average of 15.8 percent and 22.4 percent global market share 
during the periods of 1980–1989 and 1990–1999, respectively, and new orders 
delivered by these three shipbuilders have greatly increased to 31.6 million GT as 
of 2007. Even though the shipbuilding industry in Korea is currently being led by 
about a dozen large- or medium-scale shipbuilding enterprises, the Three Giants’ 
levels of influence on Korea’s shipbuilding industryare likely to be much greater 
than those of other shipbuilders; this may safely be construed as meaning that 
Korea’s shipbuilding industry is actually being led by HHI, DSME, and SHI. 
It is not difficult to find research results in the previous literature and various 
data analyses that show that the shipbuilding industry as a driving force and 
backbone of Korean economic growth has been actively led by HHI, DSME, and 
SHI (hereafter, these three shipbuilders are defined as the Three Giants).ii These 
various research results show that the Three Giants have also been growing both 
internally and externally, coupled with the rapid growth of Korea’s shipbuilding 
industry. However, previous researchers have not provided a careful analysis of 
questions about where the practical driving force that led to the explosive growth 
of the Three Giants originated and how greatly this driving force affects their 
growth. In the extension of such recognitions and questions, this study 
wholeheartedly accepts the argument that overall relations among the labor 
structures of the Three Giants, changes in their wage–labor nexus, explosive 
growth within a short period of time, and the possibility of capital accumulation 
should be magnified and discussed from various aspects. This paper notes that 
through their rapid growth process, the Three Giants have continued to take in a 
significant profit across a diverse range of channels, which led to various types of 
capital accumulation. 
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Figure 1. Market shares based on new orders 
Note: Ship Size Coverage: 100 Gross Tonnage and over. 
Source: Lloyd's World Shipbuilding Statistics; Korea Offshore and Shipbuilding Association, 
Shipbuilding Yearbook. 
 
The main aim of this paper is to examine the structural features of the Three 
Giants’ labor and changes in their wage–labor nexus, and to explore their dual-
channel capital accumulation. To do so, we focus on uncovering the transformation 
of the Three Giants’ labor structure and the factors that have either direct or 
indirect effects on their structural changes based on analyzing the production-
related worker group. Further, in order touncover the fundamental reason why the 
Three Giants continue to utilize various workforces in their production process that 
are not in direct employment relationships with them, we investigate the wage 
disparity that exists among workers from the same occupational groups, and devote 
our attention to examining the distinct groups of sub-contractors and bulk-hired 
program-specific workers for the Three Giants. In addition, to identify how the 
structural changes in the Three Giants’ labor affect their capital accumulation, 
based on an argument about the Three Giants’ labor structures and their wage–labor 
nexus, we attempt to examine the tendencies of their wealth expansion through 
various data analyses and calculations. Finally, this paper presents and highlights 
the mechanisms of dual-channel capital accumulation by classifying them as 
“Channel I” and “Channel II,” which show how the Three Giants took advantage 
ofthe possibility to accumulate capital. 
 
2. The transformation of labor structure 
As mentioned, the shipbuilding and offshore industry, in which the automation 
of critical technology skills required in the construction process may be subject to 
significant limitations, is a labor-intensive industry. Thus, it is essential for the 
Three Giants to secure a sufficient and competent workforce; further, they must 
constantly consider various labor-related problems in order to carry on their 
business activities with strong competitiveness in the world market. In particular, 
how and at what scale the Three Giants will compose their required workforces, 
where these workforces can be secured, and how they can effectively utilize their 
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secured workforces in a business environment with diverse and unexpected factors 
can be regarded asthe most important issues the Three Giants face for continued 
business operations. 
In the 1990s, when Korea’s shipbuilding industry entered its maturation period, 
the workforces of the Three Giants began to be divided into four different 
occupational groups: engineers (production management, design, and R&D); in-
house production workers; management and administrative employees; and in-
house subcontract workers. iii  As their business scale continues to expand 
graduallyyear after year, the scale of the four occupational groups alsoconstantly 
expands. The Three Giants hired only 41,316 employees in these four occupational 
groups in 1990 (i.e., 24,723 workers at HHI, 12,968 workers at DSME, and 4,075 
workers at SHI), but as of 2014, this number had substantially increased to 150,656 
(i.e., 66,607 workers at HHI; 48,224 workers at DSME; and 35,825 workers at 
SHI), a nearly 265 percent increase.iv Further, through the 1990–2014 period, trend 
analysis using data from the Korea Offshore and Shipbuilding Association 
identifies that the scale of overall employment at the Three Giants has shown a 
tendency to gradually increase over a period of 25 years. We do not disagree that 
such a tendency could be a key clue to understanding the changes in the Three 
Giants’ labor structure, but the main point we would like to emphasize here is that 
above all things, analyzing where this gradual increase in employment scale mainly 
originates from, or whether the increase occurs across the four occupational groups 
evenly or in a specific occupational group is a very important task, and these 
questions should be clearly addressed. 
As is generally known, the Three Giants’ operational business competencies are 
largely concentrated in the construction of giant structures such as large ships, 
floating vessels, and offshore facilities. For this reason, it is common for the 
proportion of production-related workers involved directly in construction 
processes at the shipyard, or the proportion of in-house production workers and in-
house subcontract workers, to be higher than the proportion of engineers and 
management and administrative employees. As of 2014, the proportion of in-house 
production workers and in-house subcontract workers at the Three Giants reached 
83.4 percent of all employees in the four occupational groups (i.e., HHI: 84.2 
percent, DSME: 86.8 percent, and SHI: 77.2 percent).v Through these data, we can 
clearly see that the Three Giants have a labor structure depending on production-
related workers at a high level. However, in order to understand more clearly the 
labor structure of the Three Giants, it is necessary to thoroughly examine their 
structural change process and the factors that have an effect on these changes, 
based on analyzing the production-related workers group. 
First, to determine how the Three Giants’ labor structures have evolved, why 
they have evolved into their current form, and how the newly evolved labor 
structure can be maintained, it is necessary to quantify changes in the labor 
structure so that they can be objectively understood; this can be done through the 
use of the Labor Structure Specialization Index (LSSIt).vi Use of LSSIt scores can 
reveal what type of workforce the Three Giants’ labor structures specialize in. In 
other words, the LSSIt can be used to assess whether the Three Giants depend more 
on in-house production workers or in-house subcontract workers to carry on their 
business activities. An LSSIt score that is closer to 1.00 indicates a stronger “in-
house subcontract worker–oriented labor structure” (IS labor structure), while a 
score closer to –1.00 indicates a stronger “in-house production worker–oriented 
labor structure’ (IP labor structure). Using the LSSIt is a methodological necessity 
to satisfactorily describe the evolution of the Three Giants’ labor structures from 
1990 to 2014. 
Our calculation of LSSIt score, as shown in Figure 2, revealed that the labor 
structures of the Three Giants have common ground, which can be summarized as 
follows: First, there is a slight difference in the period of transformation in each 
shipbuilder’s labor structure, but since the early and mid 2000s (i.e., HHI: 2007, 
DSME: 2004, and SHI: 2000), all three shipbuilders’ labor structures have fully 
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transformed from IP labor structure to an IS labor structure; second, there is a clear 
trend that all three shipbuilders’ levels of dependence on in-house subcontract 
workers for the construction process have gradually been increasing over a long 
period of time; and, third, as of 2014, the Three Giants have maintained a very high 
level of dependence on in-house subcontract workers (i.e., HHI: 0.46, DSME: 0.67, 
and SHI: 0.59), in comparison to 1990 (i.e., HHI: –0.79, DSME: –0.72, and SHI: –
0.02). 
 
 
Figure 2. Direction of evolution in labor structure and LSSIt 
Note: All data are based on their fiscal year. 
Source: Computed by the author by using data from Korea Offshore and Shipbuilding Association; 
Repository of Korea's Corporate Filings Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer. 
 
Then, the following questions arise: What lies beneath the rapid transformation 
in the Three Giants’ labor structures? And what is the practical reason for the Three 
Giants to maintain a relatively higher level of dependence on in-house subcontract 
workers than that of other production-related workers groups? The purpose or the 
reason why firms depend on the input of diverse workforces for their production 
activities actually varies, and in general thisis strongly related to their own 
corporate strategies such as labor cost reduction, cutting production costs, and 
flexible output adjustment. For instance, Hyundai Motor Company in Korea has 
found a way to escape the upward pressure on wage costs in its production system 
by alternatively utilizing low-paid workers within the Hyundai Motor Group (Kim, 
2014a; Kim, 2014b). Further, Toyota Motor Corporation in Japan has expanded its 
hiring of non-regular workers as a vehicle for labor cost-cutting and the flexible 
adjustment of domestic output in response to economic fluctuations (Kim, 2013). 
However, if arguments related to either the legal subject that employs workers or 
the substantive subject that utilizes workers are considered, it is highly likely that 
the Three Giants show a different form of labor structure, which is distinguished 
from the labor structure of automobile manufacturers like the Hyundai Motor 
Group or the Toyota Group. Further, if we approach such an argument from the 
perspective of the diversity of corporate systems, it is expected that the reason 
behind the evolution of the Three Giants’ labor structures into a specific type of 
labor structure and the reason for maintaining such a type of labor structure will be, 
obviously, different from the case of other companies in different industries; 
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therefore, an in-depth analysis of the labor structures of the Three Giantsis 
inevitable. In addition, it is necessary to analyze how the IS labor structure 
functions in each shipbuilder’s corporate system by extending the scope of the 
argument to the relationship between internal and external growth of the Three 
Giants and the evolution into an IS labor structure. 
 
3. In-house subcontract worker–oriented labor structure 
3.1. Business expansion towards the offshore plant industry and an 
increase in in-house subcontract workers 
For the past half-century, the dominant power and the initiative in the global 
shipbuilding industry has shifted from Europe to Japan, and devolved to Korea. At 
this point in time, there are signs of gradual shifting of hegemony from Korea to a 
third power. European countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and 
Sweden—which had advanced shipbuilding skills and technologies originating 
from highly sophisticated techniques in their machine industries and had 
strengthened their positions in the shipping industry over a long time—firmly 
maintained their positions as the dominant powers in the global shipbuilding 
industry until the middle of the 20th century. However, since the early 1960s, the 
initiative in the global shipbuilding industryhas gone tothe second-mover, Japan, 
which was steadily strengthening its international competitive power on the basis 
ofenormous support from the Japanese government and of its low labor costs in 
comparison with European countries. Since then, Japan has taken the lead in the 
shipbuilding industry by gaining a competitive advantage as a leading shipbuilding 
country. However, in the early 2000s, Japan had no choice but to surrender its 
reputation as the number 1 shipbuilding country to Korea, which started to increase 
its market share and to secure its competitive edge through the steady accumulation 
of shipbuilding skills, technologies, and experience in the 1980s.vii 
Figure 1 shows that the Three Giantshave experienced an unprecedented golden 
age of the shipbuilding industry since the early 2000s. An explosive increase in 
new orders delivered by these three shipbuilders provides compelling evidence that 
theyhave proven themselves as the leading companies in the global shipbuilding 
industry. In particular, the Three Giants have attempted to improve and expand 
their capability with a focus on building midsize to large ships and floating vessels 
for a long time and were able to grow in response to international demand for 
various vessels, which has rapidly increased since the early 2000s. It can be 
considered that the core driving force behind the Three Giants’ rapid growth in the 
early and mid 2000s has mainly proceeded from the shipbuilding business sector, 
but since the late 2000s, their growth has been led by both the shipbuilding 
business and the offshore plant business. In particular, for the Three Giants, the 
financial crisis of 2008 can be considered a key factor promoting rapid expansion 
of their business towards the offshore plant industry. 
The immediate and devastating aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis provided 
the growing Three Giants with an experience of tremendous crisis, but this crisis 
provided momentum for the Three Giants to expand their business area to the 
offshore plant business. Immediately after the global financial crisis, its 
considerable effect caused a rapid contraction of the global shipbuilding market, 
and a declining shipbuilding market was sufficient to change the overall behavior 
of financial institutions and their lending practices (Oh, 2016). Financial 
institutions were in a conservative mood, as the shipping companies frequently 
postponed or delayed payment or cancelled orders overall. Based on such an 
environmental change, the shipbuilding giants (i.e., the Three Giants) had no 
choice but to concentrate their capability on the offshore plant business, and they 
could not help but carry out business diversification asa specific action plan not 
only to overcome a rapid decrease in new orders, but also to cultivate a new market 
(Park, 2015a). In addition, international oil price, which displayed an upward 
tendency during the global economic slump, soared to more than 100 US dollars a 
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barrel, and remained at a high level after 2010, which made major oil corporations 
jump into the development of submarine oilfields more aggressively than before; in 
the end, the oil corporationscould not help but ask the Three Giants—which had 
enough capabilities in building giant offshore structures and facilities—to carry out 
the construction work (Park, 2015b). Ultimately, it can be concluded that internal 
and external changes in the economic climate originating from the 2008 financial 
crisis were a trigger for the Three Giants—which had focused mainly on their 
shipbuilding business—to turn their attention to the offshore plant business, and 
they also served as a catalyst for explosive expansion of their offshore plant 
business.  
In addition, business diversification of the Three Giants brought many changes 
in their labor structure. One of the most notable structural changes is that the 
inflow of in-house subcontract workers has increased at an extremely fast rate. The 
Three Giants attempted to actively seek a solution to allow their offshore plant 
business to overcome the crisis caused by a contraction of the shipbuilding market; 
therefore, they actually needed more workers for this business, and a significant 
portion of their required workforce was filled bydislocated workers who had 
worked for small and medium-sized insolvent shipbuilders that were unable 
towithstand the crisis; as a result, there has been a massive increase in the 
proportion of in-house subcontract workers within the Three Giants (Park, 2015b). 
Furthermore, bulk-hired program-specific workersviii—who are not subcontractors 
and are considered a unique type of temporary contract-based worker, but carry out 
various tasks—is utilized in various ways to build offshore plants and facilities in 
the Three Giants’ shipyards.In particular, when subcontractors whose main 
business area is focused on building offshore plants are confronted with a heavy 
workload or high workload increments, they temporarily add such temporary 
contract-based workers and flexibly utilize their workforce, which is very common 
(Park, 2015a). 
3.2 Various subjects of employment, and the substantive subject of usage 
The labor structure of the Three Giants, whose workforces include various 
worker groups, is illustrated in Figure 3. A closer look at their structural 
composition reveals that the workforces of the Three Giants are composed of three 
big worker groups: workers belonging to a prime contractor, namely a shipbuilder 
(i.e., HHI, DSME, or SHI), workers belonging to subcontractors that have a 
subcontracting relationship with a shipbuilder, and workers who are temporarily 
hired for a specified contract periodbased on subcontractors’ need for a temporary 
workforce. In general, the labor structure of a firm can be construed from a variety 
of perspectives according to what kind of standard is used as criteria for labor 
classification, but it is much easier to clearly analyze the labor structure with a 
realistic eye if we approach it based on the following two classification criteria, 
above all else: a legal subject that employs workers (i.e., employment 
relationships), and a substantive subject that utilizes workers (i.e., labor-use 
relationships).  
Based on these classification criteria, we attempted to undertake an in-depth 
analysis of various worker groups that are directly or indirectly involved in some 
aspects of the Three Giants’ construction projects of building ships and offshore 
plants, and were able to identify two different types of workers. There are workers 
whose legal subject of employment is matched witha substantive subject that 
utilizes them, but there are also workers whose legal subject of employment is not 
matched witha substantive subject that utilizes them. The workers belonging to the 
three shipbuilder occupational groups (i.e., engineers, in-house production workers, 
andmanagement and administrative employees) hold long-term employment 
contracts with the shipbuilder that offer them job security, and they are engaged 
with the shipbuilder in both employment relationships and labor-use relationships. 
On the other hand, workers who make direct employment contracts with a 
subcontractor that has a subcontracting relationship with a shipbuilder, who take 
orders from both the subcontractor and the shipbuilder, and who are involved in 
Journal of Economics Library 
JEL, 4(1), W. Kim, p.9-29. 
16 
some aspects of the shipbuilder’s construction activities are in employment 
relationships with the subcontractor, but they are in practical labor-use 
relationships with the shipbuilder, which means the shipbuilder can be regarded as 
their substantive subject of usage. In addition, bulk-hired program-specific workers 
and short-term project-specific workers—both of which can be classified as a 
temporary contract-based workers—are not formally employed by a subcontractor, 
but are temporarily hired by temporary work agencies that are commissioned by 
subcontractors to organize required workforces; therefore, subcontractors can be 
regarded as their tacitsubject of employment,ix and it is appropriate to consider a 
shipbuilder that either directly or indirectly utilizes this workforce in many ways as 
a substantive subject of usage. 
Of course, it is obvious that various worker groups are in charge of the Three 
Giants’ construction projects and are involved in some aspects of their construction 
activities for large ships, floating vessels, and offshore plants and facilities, 
regardless of how workers are classified and what kinds of standards are used. 
However, classifying the Three Giants’ workforces based on employment 
relationships and labor-use relationships reveals the very interesting fact that the 
subject of employment of each type of Three Giants worker can be the same or 
different, depending on the circumstances, but the subject of usage for all is the 
prime contractor, or the shipbuilder. In other words, each worker is involved in 
some aspects of the Three Giants’ construction activities, but regardless of the 
subject who hires them, all of them ultimately are involved in the Three Giants’ 
various construction projects within their shipyards and in substance take orders 
from the Three Giants, or the prime contractors. The entire construction process of 
ships and offshore plants is interconnected through several independent processes 
(i.e., PA, PB, …, PF) and is actually organized using several production-related 
worker groups. A closer look at each construction process reveals that one 
shipbuilder and several subcontractors supply various workforces for the purpose 
of building ships and offshore plants (see Figure 3). The number of subcontractors 
in charge of each construction process differs, depending on the construction 
process and scale, but there is a feature in common: the proportion of workers in 
employment relationships with a subcontractor is far larger than the proportion of 
workers engaged with the shipbuilder in employment relationships, and both 
worker groups are in practical labor-use relationships with the shipbuilder. To put it 
simply, the Three Giants’ construction process for building ships and offshore 
plants is organized using both a large number of external workers (e.g., in-house 
subcontract workers, bulk-hired program-specific workers) who are in labor-use 
relationships with the Three Giants and a small number of internal workers (e.g., 
in-house production workers), and each construction process uses the appropriate 
mix of these workers to form the entire construction process as a single 
construction activity. 
Then, the following question arises: What is the fundamental reason that the 
Three Giants utilize more labor forces that are not in direct employment 
relationships with them, rather than the workforces in employment relationships 
with them, for their construction activities? Further, it is also necessary to consider 
questions about what causes the Three Giants to adopt such a labor use pattern and 
how their use of labor affects their corporate systems. 
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Figure 3. Workforce composition in the Three Giants 
Source: Reconstructed by the author using sources from Korean Confederation of Trade Unions et al. 
(2016) and Korean Metal Workers' Union (2013). 
 
4. Wage disparity 
4.1. Regular unionist vs. subcontract worker 
The discussion of the wage–labor nexus of the Three Giants can be the starting 
point for determining why the Three Giants’ labor structures have fully transformed 
to the IS labor structure and how this newly evolved labor structure can be 
maintained, or why the Three Giants are actively utilizing labor forces that are not 
in direct employment relationships with them for building ships and offshore 
plants. 
In the case of Korea’s shipbuilding industry, where the influence of labor unions 
is likely to be strong, the general level of a worker’s wage depends on wage 
negotiations and collective agreements, but not all workers are subject to the same 
wage system; therefore, a certain amount ofwage disparity exists in general among 
different worker groups, for which the reasons vary. For instance, the wage system, 
in which wages, a wage class, and basic pay increase in stages according to 
duration of employment, is applied to regular employees who are in direct 
employment relationships with a prime contractor, or one of the Three Giants.x 
Therefore, the wage differential among regular employees of a prime contractor 
mostly reflects their duration of employment. However,  a slightly different wage 
system applies to in-house subcontract workers, in which the most general channels 
of adjustment to wage increases, such as an annual wage class raise, base pay, and 
so on, have no standard, and there is also wage ceilingdepending on the 
circumstances (Park, 2015a). In addition, differences are found in the number of 
wage composition items and each of the compensation levels between the regular 
employees of a prime contractor and subcontract workers; therefore, it is highly 
likely thatwage disparity exists between these two worker groups. 
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The data in Table 1 show wage disparity between regular unionists within the 
Three Giants and subcontract workers in the shipbuilding and offshore industry, 
which reveals how much wage disparity between the two worker groups actually 
existed as of 2013. First, looking at regular wage, which is a combination ofbasic 
pay and sundry allowances, it is identified that the regular wage of the Three 
Giants’ regular unionists was 2,319,221 KRW per month on average, while 
subcontract workers in the shipbuilding and offshore industry received 2,295,000 
KRW per month on average, which is 99.0 percent of the Three Giants’ regular 
unionists’ regular wage. Based on a comparison of regular wage level, it seems that 
wage disparity between these two worker groups is practically nil. However, the 
clear disparity can be verified by undertaking comparisons between these two 
worker groups in terms of monthly wage level. The disparity in monthly wage is 
higher than that found in regular wage. Themonthly wage of subcontract workers 
was 2,594,000 KRW, which equates to 89.4 percent of the monthly wage for the 
Three Giants’ regular unionists, which was 2,900,088 KRW. This shows a 
significant wage disparity between these two worker groups, providing evidence of 
wage disparity. Moreover, a wider disparity of wage levels is found in their average 
wage, which is a combination of monthly wage and other wage composition items 
such as bonus and performance-based pay: The Three Giants’ regular unionists 
received 4,779,171 KRW, while subcontract workers received 2,999,000 KRW. The 
wage disparity between these two amounts to 1,780,171 KRW per month, and the 
average wage of subcontract workers equates to only 62.8 percent of that of the 
Three Giants’ regular unionists. 
It may be possible to conclude that the wage disparities that exist between the 
Three Giants’ regular unionists and subcontract workers in the shipbuilding and 
offshore industry have been caused by two large factors. The first is a difference in 
the number of wage composition items applied to each worker group, that is, the 
wage composition items for the Three Giants’ regular unionists are much more 
diverse than those for subcontract workers. The second factor originates from a 
difference in compensation levels of each wage item applied to each workers 
group: The compensation levels for each wage item for the Three Giants’ regular 
unionists are much higher than those for subcontract workers. Thus, the general 
level of subcontract workers’ wage is lower than that of the Three Giants’ regular 
unionists, and this ultimately causes wage disparity between these two worker 
groups. In addition to the aforementioned two factors, expecting subcontract 
workers to receive an increase of wage class and of basic pay is quite difficult, 
without regard for duration of employment, which can be another factor that fosters 
wage disparity between them and workers belonging to the Three Giants. 
 
Table 1. Wage comparison between regular unionists and subcontract workers 
 
Note: The average figure for the Three Giants’ regular unionists = 100. Regular wage* = Basic pay + 
Sundry allowances. Monthly wage** = Regular wage + Overtime pay. Average wage*** = Monthly 
wage + Bonus + Performance-based pay. 
Source: Anne (2015); Korean Metal Workers' Union (2014; 2015). 
 
  Absolute level   Relative level  
(Unit: KRW; %) 
Regular 
wage* 
Monthly  
wage** 
Average  
wage*** 
Regular 
wage 
Monthly 
wage 
Average 
wage 
Regular unionist        
 HHI 2,112,233 2,793,338 4,659,817 91.1 96.3 97.5 
 DSME 2,279,331 2,982,828 5,057,485 98.3 102.9 105.8 
 SHI 2,566,100 2,924,100 4,620,212 110.6 100.8 96.7 
 Average 2,319,221 2,900,088 4,779,171 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Subcontract worker       
 Primary 2,292,000 2,618,000 3,083,000 98.8 90.3 64.5 
 Secondary 2,332,000 2,532,999 2,712,000 100.6 87.3 56.7 
 Tertiary 2,227,000 2,478,000 2,794,000 96.0 85.4 58.5 
 Average 2,295,000 2,594,000 2,999,000 99.0 89.4 62.8 
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4.2. Subcontract worker vs. bulk-hired program-specific worker 
If there is wage disparity between subcontract workers and bulk-hired program-
specific workers like that between the Three Giants’ regular unionists and 
subcontract workers, analyzing its level could be a stepping stone to finding out the 
Three Giants’ ultimate purpose for utilizing workers who are not in direct 
employment relationships with them for building ships and offshore plants. 
Unlike subcontract workers, who consistently work within a specific 
shipbuilder’s shipyard, bulk-hired program-specific workers are temporary workers 
working at different shipyards in various regions based on short-term contracts in 
response to irregular labor demand; therefore, it is expected that their average wage 
level will be relatively lower than subcontract workers’ average wage level. 
However, Figure 4 reveals an interesting fact: The wage disparity between 
subcontract workers and bulk-hired program-specific workers is against the odds. 
As of 2013, subcontract workers in the shipbuilding and offshore industry received 
35,988,000 KRW per year on average. A closer look at wage levels bysubcontractor 
group reveals that primary subcontractors, secondary subcontractors, and tertiary 
subcontractors received 36,996,000 KRW, 32,544,000 KRW, and 33,528,000 KRW 
per year on average, respectively. There is, of course, wage disparity among these 
subcontract workers; however, it is at a very low level. A slight difference in the 
wage level of bulk-hired program-specific workers is identified according to 
region, but taken as a whole, their wage level is higher than the wage level of 
subcontract workers. In the case of the Geoje area, bulk-hired program-specific 
workers receive 45,110,000 KRW per year, which is higher than the wage level for 
bulk-hired program-specific workers in the other four regions, reflecting 125.3 
percent of subcontract workers’ average yearly wage, which is quite a high level of 
disparity. In addition, it is identified that the wage level of bulk-hired program-
specific workers is rather higher than that of workers belonging to secondary 
subcontractors or tertiary subcontractors, except in the Changwon area. To 
summarize, bulk-hired program-specific workers in five regions (i.e., Geoje, 
Tongyeong, Changwon, Ulsan, and Mokpo) receive 37,989,000 KRW per year on 
average, which is 103.3 percent of a subcontract worker’s average yearly wage. 
The existence of a significant wage disparity between subcontract workers and 
bulk-hired program-specific workers was identified, but the fact that the level of 
this wage disparity is rather small compared to wage disparity between regular 
unionists within the Three Giants and subcontract workers in the shipbuilding and 
offshore industry should be considered significant. Moreover, in the case of bulk-
hired program-specific workers, who can generally be regarded as workers lower in 
the labor hierarchy than subcontract workers, it is extraordinary that their wage 
level is higher than the wage level of subcontract workersin spite of the small 
number of wage composition items. Thus, it is necessary to consider questions 
about the Three Giants’ tacit aim in utilizing bulk-hired program-specific workers 
whose wage level is relatively high; that is, what do the Three Giants expect from 
the utilization of these workforces for their construction activities? 
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Figure 4. Wage disparity by worker group 
Note: The subcontract workers’ yearly wage is computed by using data from Table 1. 
Source: Anne (2015); Korean Metal Workers' Union (2014; 2015). 
 
5. Dual-channel capital accumulation (I) 
5.1. Corporate growth and capital accumulation 
The growth of a company can be defined from various perspectives. An external 
expansion of business scale proceeding from enlargement of the company’s 
business activities can be one way to define the growth of the company; an internal 
expansion of business scale led by sales increase or profit increase can be another 
(Kim, 2016). In general, a firm as an organization gradually and spontaneously 
increases its wealth through internal and external growth processes. If corporate 
practices for a gradual expansion of the absolute or relative scale of a firm’s wealth 
are defined as a firm’s capital accumulation activity, it may safely be construed to 
mean that the firm is able to increase the likelihood of corporate subsistenceor 
long-term sustainability by managing its capital accumulation activities. Although 
there is no clear consensus on the optimum scale or appropriate line for a firm’s 
capital accumulation, it is obvious that firms, at least, deal with various strategies 
for attainable capital accumulation to maximize their wealth. Not only are there 
various ways for firms to accumulate wealth, but the ways and means of doing so 
are complex and wide-ranging. The representative and widely used objective 
measures to estimate the scale or size of firms’ accumulated wealth are internal 
reserves, retained earnings, and cashable assets. By undertaking an analysis of 
trend changes in these factors, patterns of sales figures, and net profit changes, it is 
possible to approach a more accurate scale of a firm’s capital accumulation. In the 
case of Korea, it is difficult to conclude that there is a gradual growing trend for all 
companies accumulating wealth, but consistent behavior for scale expansion of 
their capital accumulation is identified in large business groups after the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis, which greatly affected Korea’s economic structure. It is of 
course expected that the ways of accumulating capital and their scale will be 
relatively diverse. However, as revealed in Lee & Heo (2009), there are a few 
common aspects: Korea’s large business groups have accumulated a huge scale of 
internal reserves since the early 2000s; in particular, the top 10 largest business 
groups’ internal reserves are growing continuously, and their reserve ratiosxihave 
also remained at a high level in comparison with other companies in Korea.xii Of 
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course, such aspects of capital accumulation have been clearly seen in the Three 
Giants.  
 
 
Figure 5. Path of changes in Rt 
Note: Rt = (CSt+REt) / Ct whereRt represents reserve ratio in the year t; CSt is capital surplus in the 
year t; REt is retained earnings in the year t; and Ct represents capital in the year t. All data are based 
on their fiscal year. 
Source: Computed by the author by using data from Repository of Korea's Corporate Filings Data 
Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer. 
 
Figure 5 shows the path of changes in the Three Giants’ reserve ratio (Rt), which 
is computed using data (i.e., capital surplus, retained earnings, and capital) from 
the Repository of Korea’s Corporate Filings Data Analysis, Retrieval, and Transfer 
(DART). Our analysis clearly illustrates two features: First, the Three Giants’ Rt 
has shown a steady increasing tendency each year since the 2000s; second, while 
the scale varies, the Three Giants’ internal reserves have remained at a high level 
over the long term. In the case of HHI, Rt has drastically increased from 855.6 
percent (R1997) to 3699.7 percent (R2014), and there has been a marked increase in 
internal reserves from 1,846,799 million KRW to 14,058,976 million KRWduring 
the same period. SHI—whose Rt was recorded at 83.2 percent in 1997—also 
showed a significant increase in its reserve ratio, with a record of 414.8 percent 
(R2014); the scale of its internal reserves increased explosively from 307,771 million 
KRW in 1997 to 4,790,558 million KRW in 2014. Such a tendency is also shown in 
DSME. In its case, Rt has increased from 2.1 percent (R2000) to 209.2 percent (R2014), 
and its internal reservesshowed a rapid rise from 20,710 million KRW to 2,012,400 
million KRW. 
The increases in both reserve ratio and scale of internal reserves, which the 
Three Giants have in common, directly show that the Three Giants themselves have 
gradually increased their own wealth, which can be construed as meaning that their 
capital accumulation activities have been aggressively and actively implemented. 
Of course, it is difficult to make an absolute value judgment about the Three 
Giants’ capital accumulation activities through an expansion of their wealth; 
moreover, the ways to approach this issue and the ways to handle it are also very 
diverse. In this sense, the issue of absolute value judgmentis magnified in 
importance, but analyzing and understanding what factors play a large role as 
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capital accumulation channels for the Three Giants must be made a priority, in 
order to comprehend the corporate systems of the Three Giants. 
 
5.2. Channel I: Capital accumulation led by labor cost reduction 
We define one axis ofdual-channel capital accumulation as Channel I, which 
proceeds from labor cost reduction, and present its impact on the Three Giants’ 
capital accumulation. As mentioned, the Three Giants’ labor structures have fully 
transformed from the IP labor structure to the IS labor structure since the early and 
mid 2000s; the Three Giants have maintained a very high level of dependence on 
in-house subcontract workers. The previous sections emphasized that an in-house 
subcontract worker has an employment relationship with a subcontractor that has a 
subcontracting relationship with a shipbuilder, but this worker is in a practical 
labor-use relationship with the shipbuilder. Additionally, this study accepts the 
argument that various economic climate changes promote rapid expansion of the 
Three Giants’ business towards the offshore plant industry; therefore, a significant 
portion of their required workforce is made up of dislocated workers who worked 
for small and medium-sized insolvent shipbuilders that were unable to withstand 
the crisis.xiii 
On the basis of the aforementioned arguments, it can be concluded that the 
Three Giants have strongly maintained their corporate systems based on a growth 
pattern led by in-house subcontract workers. It is no exaggeration to say that such a 
growth pattern embeds the possibility of capital accumulation in that the more the 
Three Giantsconcentrate on internal or external growth, the more their wealth 
increases. We consider this argument to be an important point, and give it heavy 
weight. Because the large amount of labor supplied by in-house subcontract 
workers is one of the key factor that allows the Three Giants to accumulate 
practical capital, these workers represent one axis among the various channels for 
capital accumulation. The most important reason that we can unwaveringly develop 
such an argument is the strong possibility that the significant wage disparity 
between in-house subcontract workers and in-house production workers has 
eventually led to an overall labor cost reduction for prime contractors. As Park 
(2015a) argued, the general channels of adjustment to wage increases, such as an 
annual wage class raise and base pay, have no place in the wage system applied to 
in-house subcontract workers, and there is also a wage ceiling. In addition, as 
revealed in Table 1, the average wage of subcontract workers equates to only 62.8 
percent of that of the Three Giants’ regular unionists, and this figure adds 
persuasive power to the argument that the Three Giants are more likely to partially 
reduce their labor costs through the significant wage disparity between these two 
worker groups. 
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Figure 6. Direction of movement for Rt and LSSIt 
Note: All data are based on their fiscal year. 
Source: Computed by the author by using data from Korea Offshore & Shipbuilding 
Association;Repository of Korea's Corporate Filings Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer. 
 
Figure 6 shows the changes in both the Rt and the LSSIt of the Three Giants. 
One remarkable aspect of an analysis of the data is that Rt increases gradually when 
the LSSIt score shows a positive value as time passes. In other words, the changes 
in these two data points mean that the scale of internal reserves (i.e., the sum 
ofcapital surplus and retained earnings) increases as the Three Giants’ level of 
dependence on in-house subcontract workers increases. What we can assume 
through path changes in the LSSIt of the Three Giants is a possibility of their labor 
cost reduction. The in-house subcontract workers whose overall wage level is 
relatively low compared to workers belonging to a shipbuilder is freely utilized in 
various ways for the purpose of construction activities while taking orders from a 
shipbuilder; therefore, we can infer thatthe Three Giants are utilizing a workforce 
with relatively less labor cost compared to when they depend strongly on the input 
of workers who are in direct employment relationships with them. Looking at the 
issue of labor cost reduction from a wider perspective,it may be possible to 
conclude that the Three Giants are likely reducing absolute production cost through 
the utilization of in-house subcontract workers, so that the benefit from their 
utilization continues to be a factor that increases the possibility of the Three Giants’ 
capital accumulation. Thus, the overall cost savings that have been realized through 
the wage disparity between the two worker groups are steadily accumulated into 
the practical wealth of the Three Giants in various forms. This becomes Channel I 
for the Three Giants’ capital accumulation, which we define as one axis ofdual-
channel capital accumulation in this study (see Figure 7). 
 
6. Dual-channel capital accumulation (II) 
6.1. Flexible utilization of workforces led by bulk-hired program-specific 
workers and the channel of output adjustment 
The Three Giants, in common with other companies, are always exposed to the 
possibility of uncertain and varied circumstances in their business activities. 
Diverse circumstances might bring them to crisis, or could be a significant growth 
opportunity for them. Thus, how quickly the Three Giants overcome a crisis or how 
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efficiently they cope with a growth opportunityis an important issue that cannot be 
ignored. In fact, the result of such a crisis or opportunity is directly connected to a 
company’s output; therefore, from a company standpoint, it is necessary to create 
and maintain a business environment that allows the company to adjust its outputas 
swiftly and flexibly as possible when faced with abrupt and uncertain 
circumstances. If during an unexpected recession, the Three Giants are able to 
curtail their outputwithin a short period of time for a minimal loss of production, or 
if the Three Giants in an abruptly booming economy are able to increase their 
production volume within the short termat minimal cost, the practicality of loss 
minimization and profit maximization will be much greater. Of course, the profits 
and losses of a company are not determined by only the one factor of output, but 
the scale of overall profits and losses resulting in flexible output adjustment is not 
small; therefore, the relation between output adjustment and profits and 
lossescannot be ignored. From this perspective, the fact that the Three Giants are 
able to flexibly adjust their output implies that a business environment that allows 
them to flexibly adjust various factors affecting their output as planned has been 
created. Owing to the distinct particularities of the shipbuilding and offshore 
industry, which has features of both a labor-intensive industry and a capital-
intensive industry, the factors can be related to either capital or labor. However, in 
the case of the Three Giants, whose labor structures are evolving to depend on 
external workers at a high level, it is strongly expected that a labor-related factor 
will be key to the flexible adjustment of their output. Further, this is ultimately 
concluded based on how flexibly the Three Giants can utilize their required 
workforces. 
The bulk-hired program-specific workers—who work at different shipyard in 
various regions for short periods of time in response to shipbuilders’ work needs or 
irregular labor demand—are a direct example of how flexibly the Three Giants are 
utilizing required workforces for their construction activities. The bulk-hired 
program-specific workers, who are temporary workers with short-term contracts, 
represent a form of flexible employment; therefore, the Three Giants are likely to 
minimize overall loss when faced with an abrupt reduction of output based on an 
unexpected business depression by promptly reducing the employment of bulk-
hired program-specific workers. Conversely, when the Three Giants need to 
actively respond to unexpected and explosive demand for various vesselsin a 
booming economic cycle, they are likely to expect overall profit maximization and 
to achieve increased output without a labor shortage by promptly bulk hiring 
program-specific workers. In sum, for the Three Giants, which are exposed to 
uncertain and varied circumstances, bulk hiring program-specific workers can be a 
strategic means to quickly overcome a crisis or efficiently cope with a growth 
opportunity. In other words, bulk hiring program-specific workers plays an 
important role as a channel of output adjustment for the Three Giants. 
 
6.2. Channel II: Capital accumulation through flexible output adjustment 
In order to add persuasive power to the argument regarding the role of bulk 
hiring program-specific workers as a channel of output adjustment, it is necessary 
to consider the following question: Why do the Three Giants utilize bulk-hired 
program-specific workers for their construction activities even though their wage 
level is not remarkably lower than that of in-house subcontract workers? To 
address this question, we attempt to present the possibility of the Three Giants’ 
capital accumulation through Channel II, which is the other axis of their dual-
channel capital accumulation. The capital accumulation channel proceeding from 
flexible output adjustment is defined as Channel II in this study, and the Three 
Giants are highly likely to secure the practicality of overall loss minimization or 
overall profit maximization through this channel. 
As of 2013, subcontract workers in the shipbuilding and offshore industry 
received 35,988,000 KRW per year on average, while bulk-hired program-specific 
workers in the aforementioned five regions received 37,989,000 KRW, which is 
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rather higher (see Figure 4). Though these two wage data points show the average 
wage level of the two worker groups, from such a wage disparity, we can raise the 
question of why the Three Giants are separately utilizing in-house subcontract 
workers and bulk-hired program-specific workers. If the Three Giants put strong 
emphasis on labor cost reduction, they should only increase the scale of in-house 
subcontract workers when an additional increase in workforce is required owing to 
increased production volume. However, in-house subcontract workers’ contract 
terms to consistently provide their manpower to a shipbuilder are relatively longer 
than those of bulk-hired program-specific workers’ duration of employment, so that 
from the Three Giants’ standpoint, they have no choice but to consider that it is 
very difficult to change the employment scale of in-house subcontract workers 
immediately in response to various business fluctuations. Therefore, although there 
is no big expectation of labor cost reduction, bulk-hired program-specific 
workers—whose employment scale is easily adjustable in response to output 
fluctuations, or who have super-flexible employment—are appropriately utilized in 
the Three Giants’ construction process for building ships and offshore plants. 
From the Three Giants’ standpoint, it might seem that bulk hiring program-
specific workers does not result in a direct reduction of labor cost. However, froma 
holistic point of view, the Three Giants are highly likely to secure the practicality 
of a potential cost reduction that is linked to output by using the bulk hiring of 
program-specific workers as a channel of output adjustment. In other words, if bulk 
hiring program-specific workers plays a role as the Three Giants’ channel of output 
adjustment, the Three Giants are able to flexibly adjust the range and scale of 
workforce utilization based on changes in their target level of output in response to 
business fluctuations. Finally, the possibility of overall loss reduction proceeding 
from this flexible adjustment is highly likely to lead to overall cost savings. In 
simple terms, if the Three Giants have difficulty reducing unnecessary workforces 
within a short period of time as their output decreases when faced with abrupt 
output reduction, they cannot avoid labor cost loss caused by a redundant labor 
force. Conversely, if the Three Giants have difficulty securing additional required 
workforces and utilizing these workforces when faced with an abrupt increase in 
production scale, this is also highly likely to lead to overall losses for the Three 
Giants. If an environment is created that allows a firm to immediately reduce 
workforce scale when its output scale is reduced, labor cost loss will be reduced as 
much as its workforce scale. Further, labor cost savings will accumulate into a 
firm’s wealth; therefore, they may safely be regarded as capital accumulation in a 
broad sense. In sum, a high level of employment flexibility, which bulk hiring of 
program-specific workers provides, serves as a leading factor that reduces the 
likelihood of wasting the latent cost of labor for the Three Giants; therefore, the 
Three Giants hire bulk-hired program-specific workers for their construction 
activities even though their wage level is not relatively low because, in the long 
run, overall cost savings that are realized spontaneously through the utilization of 
bulk-hired program-specific workers are steadily accumulated into the practical 
wealth of the Three Giants in various forms. This is Channel II for the Three 
Giants’ capital accumulation, which we define as the other axis of dual-channel 
capital accumulation in this study (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. The mechanism of dual-channel capital accumulation 
Source: Constructed by the author. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Corporate systems come in many forms, depending on the relationships among 
diverse corporate system composition elements and their structural features. They 
consist of combinations of various structures; xiv  labor structure, which is 
highlighted in this study, is one of them. A corporate system typically shows spatial 
diversity and also evolves gradually or rapidly, thus showing temporal diversity. 
The evolution of corporate systems is caused by various factors; these various 
factors ultimately have either direct or indirect effects on the diverse structures that 
comprise a corporate system. For this reason, the corporate system of a firm is not 
continuously maintained in a standardized form. The corporate system inevitably 
undergoes evolutionary processes as time passes, and as a result, it transforms into 
another and substantially different form of corporate system. 
The authors of this study wholeheartedly accept the evolutionary perspective on 
firms and the argument regarding the diversity of corporate systems. Based on this 
framework, we attempted to examine the common labor structure features of the 
leading shipbuilding giants in South Korea and the changes in their wage–labor 
nexus, and devoted our attention to uncovering their dual-channel capital 
accumulation. Further, in order to explore the following questions, this study 
mostly focused on undertaking an overall analysis of the Three Giants (i.e., HHI, 
DSME, and SHI) from a variety of perspectives: 
 What are the key factors that accelerate the gradual evolution of the Three 
Giants’ labor structure, and how can the newly evolved labor structure be 
maintained? 
 What are the practical reasons that the Three Giants depend strongly on the 
input of in-house subcontract workers for their construction activities? 
 How does the change in the Three Giants’ labor use pattern affect their 
corporate systems? 
 Can we conclude that the only purpose of bulk hiring program-specific 
workers for the Three Giants is to reduce labor cost? 
 How do the consequences that flow from a separation of labor use relate to 
the possibility of capital accumulation for the Three Giants? 
Through the process of answering the above questions, we have found that dual-
channel capital accumulation, which allows the Three Giants to secure a strong 
element of capital accumulation, has been created through the evolution of their 
labor structure. Our findings and discussion can be summarized as follows: First, 
our calculation of the Labor Structure Specialization Index (LSSIt) and its changing 
pattern shows that since the early and mid 2000s, the Three Giants’ labor structures 
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have fully transformed to the IS labor structure; the Three Giants have maintained a 
very high level of dependence on in-house subcontract workersin terms of 
construction processes for building ships and offshore plants. Second, both the 
business diversification as a strategic decision to overcome a crisis and the 
influence of external factors caused by gradual rise of international oil prices have 
resulted in an explosive increase in the Three Giants’ level of dependence on 
external workers for construction activities, which causes the Three Giants to 
maintain an IS labor structure. Third, owing to the wage disparity that clearly exists 
between workers employed by subcontractors and the workers employed by prime 
contractors (i.e., shipbuilders), the Three Giants have a better chance of reducing 
labor costs through the use of in-house subcontract workers whose employment is 
linked to a prime contractor’s output goals. Fourth, as bulk hiring program-specific 
workers for the Three Giants’ construction activities creates a flexible and strategic 
input, the Three Giants are more likely to be able to be flexible in responding to 
unexpected and abrupt fluctuations in output within a short period of time. Fifth, as 
overall cost savings realized through utilizing relatively low-paid in-house 
subcontract workers are steadily accumulated into the practical wealth of the Three 
Giants in various forms, Channel I of their capital accumulation has been 
established and is being maintained. Sixth, the high level of employment flexibility 
provided by bulk hiring program-specific serves as a leading factor reducing the 
likelihood of wasting the latent cost of labor for the Three Giants in the long run; 
therefore Channel II of capital accumulation—where overall cost savings expected 
from utilizing bulk-hired program-specific workers are accumulated into the Three 
Giants’ practical wealthin a variety of forms—has been established and is being 
maintained. 
The aim of this study, in fact, is divided into two parts: to examine the structural 
features of the Three Giants’ labor and changes in their wage-labor nexus, and to 
uncover the Three Giants’ dual-channel capital accumulation. However, taken as a 
whole, this study comes down to one goal, which is to investigate how institutional 
factors (i.e., the Three Giants’ labor structures and their wages) increase the 
possibility of the Three Giants’ capital accumulation and what effect institutional 
factors have on their capital accumulation. The Three Giants attempt to 
appropriately combine the practical utilization of relatively low-paid workers and 
the strategic use of workers with a high level of employment flexibility, 
considering various business environments, and they utilize these workforces for 
their construction activities. This helps the Three Giants to minimize the potential 
loss based onoverall expenses and to maximizethe possibility ofmaking a profit; 
therefore, this mechanism greatly boosts the possibility of capital accumulation. 
From the company’s point of view, this may safely be construed as meaning that 
securing channels to supportthe steady increase of its wealth and lead to large-scale 
capital accumulation through such a mechanism is in some ways analogous to a 
securing a virtuous circle that promotes the stability and sustainability of its 
growth. However, we need to consider the argument about whether the mechanism, 
which is regarded as a virtuous circle from the company’s perspective, can be 
accepted asa virtuous circle from a societal perspective. In other words, there is a 
greater need to deliberate the issue of value judgment as to whether the Three 
Giants’ assertive behavior for capital accumulation itself can maintain the overall 
structural stability and sustainability of Korea’s shipbuilding and offshore industry. 
The Three Giants have created a business climate that helps to gradually boost the 
possibility of their capital accumulation through dual-channel capital accumulation, 
but the hidden side of such a business climate is the potential not only to expand 
the structural instability of labor when a prime contractor is operated by a large 
number of external workers, such as in-house subcontract workers, but also to 
cause various social issues resulting from an explosive increase in shorter-term 
contract-based nonregular workers such as bulk-hired program-specific workers, 
and short-term project-specific workers. Thus, in seriously considering such issues, 
future research will need to come up with answers to the following questions: Does 
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an optimum level of firm capital accumulation exist? If it exists, where is the 
appropriate line when it comes to a firm’s capital accumulation activity? Seeking 
the answers to these questions will strengthen the arguments made here. 
 
 
Notes 
 
i In the 1970s, the Park Chung-Hee regime in South Korea forced the strong chaebols toachieve 
economies of scale and to be involved in the shipbuilding industry, pressed for the industry’s 
enlargement (Korean Metal Workers’ Union, 2013). As a result of his strong action, three main 
shipbuilders (i.e., Hyundai Heavy Industries in 1973, Daewoo Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery 
in 1973, and Samsung Heavy Industries in 1974) were established at that time. 
ii See OECD (2014) 
iii “In-house subcontracting refers to the business practice whereby the prime contractor contracts out 
part of his/her production activities to a subcontractor, whose employees are to work within the 
prime contractor’s premise while being supervised by the subcontractor” (OECD, 2013; p.137). 
iv The data are provided by Korea Offshore and Shipbuilding Association. 
v The data are provided by Korea Offshore and Shipbuilding Association. 
vi Labor Structure Specialization Index(LSSIt) = (∑St – ∑Pt) / (∑St + ∑Pt) (t = 1990, …, 2014) where 
St is in-house subcontract workers in the year t and Pt is in-house production workers in the year t. 0 
<LSSIt≤ 1.00: IS labor structure; –1.00 ≤ LSSIt< 0: IP labor structure. 
vii One of the probable reason that Japan’s shipbuilding industry was deprived of its initiative by Korea 
is that Korea’s shipbuilders, facing the bleak prospect of shrinkage of the global shipbuilding 
industry in the late 1990s, tried to extend their production equipment and facilities through bold 
investments— unlike Japan’s shipbuilders, which attempted to reduce the size of their market by 
carrying out large-scale restructuring. However, contrary to expectations, the global shipbuilding 
industry was booming at that time so that the global situation turned in Korea’s favor (Metal 
Network Korea, 2008). 
viii Park (2105a) describes a temporary contract-based worker who works at different shipyards in 
various regions for a few weeks or several months according to work needs and who is not 
classified as an in-house subcontract worker working within a specific shipyard as a bulk-hired 
program-specific worker. 
ix See Korean Metal Workers' Union (2015). 
x See Gang (1998). 
xi Reserve ratio can be an indicator of how well a firm’s internal reserves prepare it to maintain the 
stability of its financial structure or to extend its equipment and facilities. 
xii According to Lee &Heo (2009), the sum total of internal reserves of listed companies belonging to 
the top 10 largest business groups was only 6,767,255 million KRW in 2000, but it had increased to 
17,238,981 million KRW by 2008. The Socialist Revolutionary Workers’ Party uncovered that this 
figure had increased to 644,820,700 million KRW at the end of December 2015. [Retrieved from].  
xiii See Park (2015b). 
xiv In simple terms, structure S1 (e.g., labour structure), as one of the structures that comprises a 
corporate system, exists in firm A in the form S1A; in firm B, in the form S1B; and in firm C, in the 
form S1C. Moreover, the other structures (i.e., S2, S3, …,S6, S7, …) that also comprise each corporate 
system exist in firms A, B, and C as different types of structures—which is to say, as (S2A, S3A, …, 
S6A, S7A, …), (S2B, S3B,…, S6B, S7B, …), and (S2C, S3C,…, S6C, S7C, …), respectively. In more concrete 
terms, the structure S1 that exists in firm A in the form S1A cannot be identical to the form S1A in 
firms B or C. This is because the factors that affect (or affected) each firm’s structure S1 are 
completely different, and so the level of their influence will also be very different. 
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